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Abstract
This study examines whether audit market structure affects audit
quality and audit pricing. We analyze two conceptually distinct
dimensions of market structure: audit market concentration and
client mobility. Focusing on the private-client segment of the Bel-
gian auditmarket, we compare the pricing and quality effects ofmar-
ket structure between the segment of small andmedium-sized (SME)
clients and the segment of large clients to test how audit complexity
moderates such effects. We find that market concentration impairs
price and quality competition in the SME-client segment. Market
concentration is unrelated to audit quality in the large-client seg-
ment, where we argue that concentration is endogenous to audit
complexity. Furthermore, we find that client mobility stimulates
price competition inboth segmentsbut improves audit quality only in
the large-client segment. We interpret our findings as evidence that
(a) audit market concentration impairs competition especially when
audits have low complexity and that (b) the large-client market seg-
ment, characterized by higher audit complexity and higher market
concentration, can also be price and quality competitive if clients are
sufficiently mobile, and change auditors relatively frequently.
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1 INTRODUCTION
This study examines the effect of auditmarket structure on audit quality and audit pricing in the private-client segment
of the audit market in Belgium. Regulators worldwide have expressed concerns that the current structure of the audit
market restricts effective competition among audit firms and, in turn, may lead to noncompetitive pricing or impair
audit quality (European Commission, 2010; Financial Reporting Council [FRC], 2018; US Government Accountability
Office [GAO], 2003, 2008). Most recently, the UK Competition & Markets Authority (CMA, 2019) argued that high
audit market concentration is a “deep-seated problem” that creates “limited choice and a market that is not resilient”
(p. 6), and proposed to open up the market for challenger audit firms through mandating joint audits. The CMA’s con-
clusion and proposal are based, at least in part, on the premise that high market concentration has led to low audit
quality, more in particular to recent accounting scandals such as those at BHS andCarillion. Inmaking this premise, the
CMAadheres to theUK Labour Party’s view that changing the auditmarket structure is an indispensable step towards
improving audit quality (Sikka et al., 2018). This view is, however, neither unequivocally supported by academic evi-
dence nor the shared consensus amongst practitioners (see e.g., CMA, 2019, p. 46).1
The debate on the effect of audit market structure on competition and audit quality seemingly revolves around
two different viewpoints (see, e.g., GAO, 2008; House of Lords, 2011). One viewpoint is that high concentration of
audit firms’ market shares reflects a lack of competition and a potential threat to high-quality audits at efficient prices.
Another viewpoint is that an audit market’s degree of concentration has arisen as a natural response to client firms’
demand for audit quality. In particular, some have argued that high concentration in large-client audit markets is
a necessity that ensures that audit firms achieve economies of scale and have the audit technology and resources
required to undertake complex large-client audits (e.g., Danos & Eichenseher, 1982; Dopuch & Simunic, 1980; Pound
& Francis, 1981; Sirois & Simunic, 2011).2 Better alignment of audit firms’ resources with large clients’ needs can, in
turn, help audit firms to charge premium fees (e.g., Numan andWillekens, 2012; Shapiro, 1989). Both viewpoints imply
different consequences for the relationship between audit market structure, audit quality, and audit fees. The former
viewpoint suggests that concentration reduces audit quality and increases audit firms’ pricing power; the latter view-
point predicts that concentration is at least partly endogenous to client firms’ audit demands and thus affects audit
quality and audit fees conditional on the complexity of the audit.3 This study empirically contrasts these views, thereby
addressing two related questions: (1) Is audit market concentration associated with price or quality competition, after
controlling for audit complexity? (2) Do audit firms compete on price or quality also in market segments where higher
audit complexity stimulates higher levels of concentration?
One hurdle in examining whether market structure’s effect on audit quality and pricing is conditional on audit
complexity is the need for a large sample of mandatory audits of sufficiently varying degrees of complexity, including
audits in which scale economies are of low importance. A sample of public-client audits tends to be biased toward
audits of higher complexity, as potentially evidenced by the worldwide dominance of Big Four audit firms in the
public-client segment of the audit market. To overcome this issue, we focus our analysis on segments of the private-
client audit market in Belgium, where audits are mandatory and there is a comparatively large variation in audit
complexity and market structure. While defining audit market segments by geographical area—a key driver of market
segmentation—and client size—an observable measure of audit complexity—we examine two conceptually distinct
1For example, some auditors indicated to the Competition & Markets Authority that its view that low audit quality is widespread is “more perception than
reality” (Deloitte, 2019) andderivesmore from theexperienceof a fewaccounting scandals than fromsystematic evidence (see e.g., CMA, 2019, p. 46; Institute
of Chartered Accountants of Scotland, 2019; KPMG, 2019; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2019). Furthermore, audit clients responding to the CMA indicated
that they “did not have concerns about the quality of their audit process or did not think that the evidence [the CMA] presented indicated that there was a
systematic problemwith audit quality in the UK” (CMA, 2019, p. 46).
2In accordance with this idea, audit committee members interviewed by the UK Competition &Markets Authority (CMA, 2019) argued that challenger (non-
BigFour) audit firms are less capable of performing complex audits becauseof their smaller international networks, smaller audit teams, and lower investments
in technology (p. 90).
3Throughout the paperwe use the term “audit complexity” to describe awide range of factors that contribute to the complexity level of the audit. Such factors
include, for example, organizational and operational complexity as well as the level of audit quality desired by the client firm (and its stakeholders).
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but related dimensions of audit market structure: audit market concentration (cf. Francis, Michas, & Seavey, 2013;
Pearson & Trompeter, 1994; Simunic, 1980) and client mobility, as captured by the instability of audit firms’ market
shares (Buijink, Maijoor, &Meuwissen, 1998; Caves & Porter, 1978).
We focus on the Belgian private-client audit market, as this is one of the very fewmarkets that has (1) a sufficiently
long time series of accounting and audit fee data and (2) detailed data on audit partner identity and location, which
we need to construct audit market segments. The Belgian audit market for private clients is also of more conceptual
interest. Past regulatory constraints on Belgian audit firms’ growth have created an exogenous source of variation in
the structures of market segments as well as caused the Belgian audit market to have a comparatively low degree of
concentration (Boone, Meuwissen, & van Witteloostuijn, 2009). Further, the Belgian private-client market has a high
degree of fee transparency that is comparable to the degrees of transparency observed in public-client markets. This
high degree of transparency presumably strengthens the relationship between audit effort and audit fees, discourages
low balling, and stimulates audit firms in the private-client market to explicitly trade off price against quality compe-
tition, similar to their peers in public-client markets. We therefore examine both dimensions of competition. Finally,
understanding the effect ofmarket structure on competition in the audit market for private clients is of practical inter-
est because of private firms’ importance to the economy as well as their economic relevance to the audit sector in
Europe (Langli & Svanström, 2014;Wymenga, Spanikova, Barker, Konings, & Canton, 2011).
We argue that market concentration must be close to exogenous to audit complexity in the SME-client segment of
the audit market because SME-clients’ demand for technology- and resource-intensive audits is generally low. For this
reason we focus the first part of the analysis on the SME-client segment, where we find that market concentration is
positively associatedwith audit fees and negatively associatedwith audit quality.We interpret this finding as evidence
ofmarket concentration’s adverse effects onprice andquality competition—evidence that is, by construction, robust to
the influence of audit complexity. Turning to the sample of large-client audits, we find that market concentration is not
significantly associated with audit quality, supporting the notion that in segments where audit complexity is relevant,
market concentration is a consequence of demand-driven resource optimization rather than the creation of market
power. In the second part of the analysis, we examine the question of whether price or quality competition exists in
the large-client segment of the audit market, despite the hypothesized need for concentration. Using client mobility
as an alternative, dynamic measure of market structure that is not endogenous to audit complexity, we find that the
negative relationship between client mobility and audit fees is not less pronounced in the large-client segment than in
the SME-client segment of the auditmarket. Further, we find that the positive relationship between clientmobility and
audit quality is even more pronounced for large-client audits than for SME-client audits. These findings indicate that,
in spite of high levels of concentration, price and quality competition do exist in the large-client segment of the audit
market. In sum, the empirical evidence confirms regulators’ fears that audit market concentration impairs price and
quality competition, but only in a settingwhere audits have low complexity. In a settingwhere audits aremore complex
and audit firms’ search for scale economies necessitates some degree of concentration, we find that client mobility
stimulates price competition and improves audit quality.
Our study contributes to the literature on audit market structure in various ways. First, this study makes a first
attempt to account for the endogeneity of audit market concentration to audit complexity when examining the
relationship between concentration, audit pricing, and audit quality. Specifically, in contrast to prior studies, we test
the effect of market concentration in a setting where concentration is plausibly exogenous. Further, we show that the
effect ofmarket concentration on audit quality is a function of audit complexity: negative for SME clients but negligible
for large clients. This finding is of importance to regulators as it confirms that audit market concentration can have
net benefits if it allows audit firms to obtain scale economies in the investments required for complex audits. Second,
we examine the competition effects of client mobility, which better captures dynamics in audit markets than market
concentration measures. Doing so not only counters some of the limitations of market concentration measures that
we discuss in this study, but also shows thatmore concentratedmarket segments, such as that for large clients, can still
be competitive if clients are mobile. As such, our study potentially contributes to a broadening of the debate on what
determines competition in audit markets. Third, we focus our analysis on private-client audits. Despite the importance
4 VAN RAAK
of private firms, in the economy (Vanstraelen & Schelleman, 2017) as well as in audit firms’ client portfolios, the
overwhelming majority of prior research on economic implications of audit market structure has been conducted in
public-client settings. This study’s evidence on the pricing and quality effects of market structure in the private-client
segment of the audit market thus contributes to a more comprehensive understanding of how audit market structure
affects audit firms’ behavior. Finally, by showing that the level of competition varies within a country, across regions,
our study confirms the importance of measuringmarket structure at a local rather than a national level, as done by, for
example, Chu, Simunic, Ye, and Zhang (2018), Eshleman and Lawson (2017), and Numan andWillekens (2012).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. The next section describes the setting of our study, the Belgian
market for private audits. Section 3 discusses prior literature on the relationship between audit market structure and
audit quality and develops our hypotheses. Section 4 outlines themethodology and data selection procedure. Section 5
presents the empirical results and Section 6 concludes.
2 THE BELGIAN MARKET FOR PRIVATE-CLIENT AUDITS
This study examines the audit market for private clients in Belgium. In this section, we describe some of this market’s
characteristics that are of relevance to our hypotheses and conclusions.
Although the structures of markets for private-client audits vary across Europe, primarily under the influence of
local market forces and regulation, the main objectives and procedures of private-client audits in Belgium are broadly
similar to those in other European countries. The European Union’s past efforts to harmonize European accounting
and audit regulation have acted as an important catalyst in achieving such similarity.4 We therefore expect that the
effects of market structure on the pricing and quality of private-client audits are broadly comparable across Europe
and see no immediate reason to suppose that, on an inferential level, our findings would not apply to other European
settings. Notwithstanding the similarities across European private-client audits, there are some peculiarities of the
Belgian audit market that are of relevance to our study.
Belgium has a code-law legal system of French origin and, like many other continental European countries, has
strong legal enforcement, high ownership concentration, weak protection of minority investor rights and a stock mar-
ket that is of limited importance, certainly compared toAnglo-Saxon countries such as theUKand theUS (Bauwhede&
Willekens, 2004; La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer, &Vishny, 1997, 1998; Leuz, Nanda, &Wysocki, 2003).Most com-
panies in Belgium are privately held, often family-owned, but subject to audit as audits of public financial statements
are mandatory for all but the smallest companies, regardless of listing status.5 This latter characteristic underlines
that accounting and audit regulation aims to protect all stakeholders of a company, not just shareholders (Bauwhede,
Willekens, & Gaeremynck, 2003; Gaeremynck &Willekens, 2003).
While Belgium has a low litigious environment (Vanstraelen & Willekens, 2008), it has several mechanisms that
aim to safeguard audit quality (Gaeremynck, Van Der Meulen, &Willekens, 2008), also in private-client engagements.
First, mandatory audits must be carried out by an auditor who is a qualified member of the Belgian Institute of
Auditors (Vanstraelen, 2000;Willekens&Achmadi, 2003).6 Second,Belgian auditors are appointed for renewable peri-
ods of three years (Knechel & Vanstraelen, 2007), which temporarily protects auditors’ investments in client-specific
4Influential EU harmonization efforts include the introduction of the Fourth, Seventh, and Eighth (Revised) EUCompany LawDirectives.
5As per Belgian Company Law, companies are subject to mandatory audit, when they meet two of the following three criteria: (a) their balance sheet total
exceeds €4.4million, (b) turnover exceeds € 8.8million, or (c) the average number of employees exceeds 50. Public firms and firmswithmore than 100 employ-
ees are always required to be audited (Hardies, Breesch, & Branson, 2015).
6Because auditors effectively only qualify for membership after having passed the Belgian examination of professional competence (or a Belgian aptitude
test, as defined in EU Directive 2005/36/EC, for auditors qualified in another EU country), this membership requirement hinders cross-border audits and
makes the Belgian audit market a predominantly national market. In our empirical analysis, we therefore assume that Belgian auditors do not compete with
foreign auditors.
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knowledge and, consequently, aims to improve auditor independence and quality.7 Third, audit fees must be approved
by shareholders at the annual general meeting (Hardies et al., 2015) and audit firms are required by law to report audit
hours andaudit fees to theBelgianprofessional body. This latter requirement facilitatesmonitoring of audit quality and
pricing and verifying that fees reflect the time and effort invested in the audit (Boone et al., 2009), thereby constraining
practices of low balling. Finally, Belgian auditors are not allowed to provide certain non-audit services, including book-
keeping, valuation, and tax consulting services, to a legal entity that they audit (see, e.g., Royal Decree of 4 April 2003).
The above mechanisms have important implications for our study. First, their presence underlines the importance
that regulators attach to audit quality and pricing, also in the private-client segment of the audit market. Second,
as shown by Boone et al. (2009), these mechanisms have created market frictions constraining the ability of Belgian
audit firms to grow—through, for example, low balling or diversification of services—and thus optimize scale and scope
economies. These frictions are notably reflected in the degree of fragmentation of the Belgian audit market. During
our sample period from 2006 to 2011, the number of audit firms in the private-client segment of the Belgian audit
market ranged between 108 and 186. The market share of the Big 4 audit firms, calculated using audit fees, ranged
between 65% and 77%. Hence, Big 4 dominance and market concentration are much lower in Belgium than in Anglo-
Saxon countries (see alsoWillekens & Achmadi, 2003). The existence of market frictions is also of great importance to
our empirical analysis and identification strategy. That is, such frictions provide a plausibly exogenous source of vari-
ation in market structures and thus make us more comfortable with drawing causal inferences about the relationship
betweenmarket structure and audit pricing or quality. Finally, the high degree of price transparency in theBelgianmar-
ket for private-client audits strengthens the relationshipbetweenaudit fees andauditor effort. As a consequence, audit
firms’ competitive strategies involve an explicit trade-off between price and quality competition; that is, an emphasis
on offering competitive prices (quality) makes an audit firm unavoidably less quality (price) competitive.
Prior literature also highlights characteristics of private-client audits that may affect audit quality and/or pricing
irrespective of country setting. Although auditors serving a diversified portfolio of private clients are not likely to
become economically dependent on one or a few clients (Svanström, 2013), prior research nonetheless considers
auditor independence—an important driver of audit quality—as more vulnerable in private-client engagements than
in public-client engagements (Langli & Svanström, 2014). Forces contributing to heightened auditor independence risk
in private-client audits are: (a) social bonding betweenmanagers and auditors (Svanström, 2013); (b) low litigation and
reputation risk (Gaeremynck &Willekens, 2003; Hope & Langli, 2010; Vanstraelen & Schelleman, 2017); (c) pressure
from controlling shareholders (Coffee, 2005), and (d) a greater importance of non-audit services such as accounting
and tax consultancy (Chaney, Jeter, & Shivakumar, 2004; Svanström, 2013). Further, of particular importance to our
analysis of the private-client segment of the audit market is the absence of capital market pressure to hire reputable
brand-name auditors (Chaney et al., 2004). In the absence of such pressure, clients can more freely choose their audi-
tor andwill presumably give greaterweight to their audit quality-price preferences in auditor selection.Weexpect that
such freedom of choice, in turn, facilitates competition on quality or price, thereby making the private-client segment
of the audit market a well-suited setting to study the price and quality effects of market structure and competition.
Finally, prior research suggests that private clients benefit less from the audit than public clients because the for-
mer have smaller agency conflicts, less complex chains of control, and less demand for external expertise in complex
accounting issues (Abdel-Khalik, 1993; Langli & Svanström, 2014). This is of relevance to our study because the extent
to which audit fees reflect the price effects of competition depends on the price elasticity of clients’ demand for audit
services (Simunic, 1980). That is, if clients substitute external audit services for internal controls when audits become
less expensive, implying high elasticity of demand, the relationship between total audit fees and competition will be
weaker than if demand is inelastic. If private clients perceive thebenefits of the audit to be small but regulation requires
them to purchase a minimum level of audit services, their demand will be close to the mandated minimum and thus
7During our sample period, audit mandates were renewable for an unlimited number of times. Since 2007, rules issued by the Institute of Auditors require
public interest entities (listed companies, credit institutions, and insurance companies) to rotate audit partner every six years. Since 2016, audit firms of public
interest entities must rotate every nine years, unless a public tender process is followed after nine years. Because we exclude listed and financial companies
from our sample, it is not likely that auditor rotation rules affect our analysis.
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insensitive to price changes. Therefore, the price elasticity of private clients’ demand for audit services is less than that
of public clients. Consequently, audit fees better capture the price effects of competition in our sample of private-client
audits than in a sample of public-client audits.
In sum, the foregoing discussion leads us to characterize the Belgian market for private-client audits as a market
with (a) a comparatively low degree of concentration, (b) friction-induced exogenous variation in structure, (c) sig-
nificant discretion in auditor choice, (d) comparatively low importance of non-audit services, (e) a strong relationship
between audit pricing and audit quality, (f) a high sensitivity of audit fees to price competition, and (g) heightened audi-
tor independence risk, which is potentially mitigated by national regulation on audit mandates and non-audit services.
3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT
3.1 Market concentration
In the industrial organization literature, the traditional view of the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) paradigm
has been that market structure, in particular market concentration, drives firm conduct (and performance). Specifi-
cally, starting with Mason (1939) and Bain (1951, 1956), researchers adhering to this view have argued that suppli-
ers of products or services can gain market power through higher market concentration and, consequently, can earn
higher market rents or economize on product and service quality. Turning to the audit market, this view predicts that
oligopolistic audit firms engage in collusion to coordinate audit supply or pricing. Oligopolistic dominance may also
reduce thepressure felt by audit firms to innovate services (GAO,2008). Reducedaudit effort in combinationwith stale
audit proceduresmay, in turn, lead to lower audit quality.8 It is this traditional view that has sparked concerns amongst
regulators and financial statement users that the existence of a highly concentrated audit market, in which a few large
audit firms share the market, may cause excessive audit pricing and suboptimal audit quality. The traditional strand of
thought still resonates in recent regulatory discussions, such as those introducedby theEuropeanCommission’sGreen
Paper on Audit Policy (2010), the House of Lords Economic Affairs Committee (2011), the Financial Reporting Council
(2018) and the Competition &Markets Authority (2019), and continues to stimulate calls for reduced concentration in
audit markets.
TheSCPparadigmassumes that thedegreeofmarket concentration is exogenous to firmconduct (Bain, 1951, 1956;
Etro, 2014;Mason, 1939). An alternative, contrasting viewposits thatmarket concentration arises endogenouslywhen
firms strive for economies of scale or scope under the stimuli of competition and clients’ demand for audit quality (see,
e.g., Demsetz, 1973; Etro, 2014; Sutton, 1991). In this view,market concentration is not a causal determinant of quality
or pricing. Instead, a concentrated audit market arises when (a) clients demand high audit quality and (b) only a limited
number of audit firms canmake sunk investments in the specialist skills and audit technology that are required to offer
such quality in complex large-client audits (e.g., Danos& Eichenseher, 1982; Dopuch& Simunic, 1980; Sirois & Simunic,
2011), potentially at a higher price.
Predictions arising from the above two views are not mutually exclusive. In fact, also if market concentration
develops endogenously in response to the need for scale economies in complex audits (as predicted by the alternative
view), market frictions can create an exogenous source of variation in concentration. One example of such frictions is
Belgium’s regulatory restrictions on audit firms’ ability to grow thatwe discussed in section 2. The resulting exogenous
deviations from an equilibrium level of market concentration can then affect competition in the way predicted under
the traditional view. Synthesizing both views, we argue that studies examining the causal effect of audit market
concentration on price competition, as predicted under the traditional view, must account for the possibility that (a)
more complex audit clients indeed pay premium fees for technology- and resource-intensive audits and (b) market
8Moreover, theUSGovernmentAccountabilityOfficewarns that dominant firmsmay coordinate actions to convince standard setters to introduce newaudit-
ing standards with the sole purpose of generating higher fee income (GAO, 2008).
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concentration is endogenous to audit complexity, as predicted under the alternative view. If such studies do not
sufficiently control for audit complexity, empirical estimates of the influence of audit market concentration on audit
fees are positively biased in expectation. A similar line of reasoning applies when audit quality is the dependent
variable, which wewill discuss later in this section.9
Prior researchon theeffect of auditmarket concentrationonaudit fees is limited andhasproduced inconclusive evi-
dence. Focusing on a restricted sample ofUShealth insurance andproperty and casualty insurance companies, Pearson
and Trompeter (1994) find evidence that highermarket concentration leads to lower audit fees. Numan andWillekens
(2012) find the same for a sample of US listed firms, while considering local, industry-segmented audit markets. In con-
trast, some studies find apositive associationbetween (local)market concentration andaudit pricing in various typesof
audits: in Canadian municipal audits by non-Big 6 firms (Bandyopadhyay & Kao, 2004), in Chinese public-client audits
(Huang, Chang, & Chiou, 2016), and in US public-client audits (Eshleman & Lawson, 2017).
Other studies examine how audit firms’ pricing power changed from before to after a period of increasing consol-
idation among audit firms. For example, Willekens and Achmadi (2003) show that the pricing power of audit firms in
the Belgian private-clientmarket decreased following a period of auditmarket consolidation, suggesting an increase in
price competition. In contrast, examining similar changes in consolidation but focusing on samples of publicly held UK
clients, Iyer and Iyer (1996) andMcMeeking, Peasnell, andPope (2007) findmixedor insignificant changes in audit fees.
The omission of economic factors that jointly determine market structure and audit pricing from the analysis may
at least partly explain the inconclusiveness of prior evidence. For example, Eshleman and Lawson (2017) show that in
the US market, controlling for previously omitted regional audit pricing factors changes the estimated effect of mar-
ket concentration on audit fees from negative to positive. Further, studies comparing audit firms’ pricing power over
time are unavoidably affected by potentially confounding changes in other determinants of pricing power, such as reg-
ulatory or economic developments (see, e.g., Maher, Tiessen, Colson, & Broman, 1992). Audit complexity is an omitted
economic factor that has received little explicit attention in past research. However, it is not inconceivable that prior
studies examining the relationship between audit fees and market concentration, especially those focusing on public
clients, suffer from estimation bias caused by the omission of accurate controls for audit complexity.10
Because audit complexity is at least partly unobservable, to obtain anunbiasedestimateof the relationship between
market concentration and audit fees wemust focus on a sample of audits in which concentration is close to exogenous.
In section 2, we argued that private clients benefit less from the audit than public clients. Along a similar line of rea-
soning, we expect that small andmedium-sized private clients (hereafter referred to as SME clients) have a lower com-
plexity and, in turn, a lower demand for technology- and resource-intensive audits than large private clients (see also
Vanstraelen & Willekens, 2008). SME clients generally are more likely to have owner-managers, less complex chains
of control, and less complex accounting issues than large clients. Auditors of SME clients therefore rely comparatively
less on audit technology and more on personal knowledge and skills, face-to-face interactions, and soft information
acquired in a trusted advisor relationship (see, e.g., Shukarova-Savovska & Hodge, 2016; Langli & Svanström, 2014).
Consequently, we expect that economies of scale or scope have low relevance in the market for SME audits, causing
the correlation betweenmarket concentration and (omitted) drivers of audit complexity to be close to zero.We exploit
this feature of themarket for SME audits to obtain an unbiased estimate of the effect of concentration on price compe-
tition. In sum,we hypothesize that in the absence of a need formarket concentration in the SMEauditmarket segment,
concentration helps audit firms to increase their market power and hence increase audit fees.
Hypothesis 1 Audit market concentration is positively associated with audit fees in the SME audit market segment.
9A similar concern applies to measures of competition that are based on audit firms’ degree of differentiation through specialization, such as examined by
Numan andWillekens (2012) and Bills and Stephens (2016), as specialization can be also characterized as a form of demand-driven resource optimization.
10That is, if (a) more complex audit clients indeed pay premium fees for higher quality and (b) market concentration is endogenous to audit complexity, as
predicted under the alternative view, empirical estimates of the influence of audit market concentration on audit fees and audit quality may be biased if audit
complexity is ignored.
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We also examine whether increased concentration reduces audit quality because of an implied lack of competition.
Prior evidence on the relationship between audit market concentration and audit quality is again mixed and limited in
scope. Analyzing a sample of US listed firms, Newton,Wang, andWilkins (2013) measure market concentration at the
metropolitan statistical area (MSA) level (i.e. city level) and find a negative association between concentration and the
likelihood of restatements, suggesting that market concentration is positively associated with audit quality. Eshleman
and Lawson (2017) find a similarly positive effect of concentration when using discretionary accruals as a measure of
audit quality. In contrast, Boone, Khurana, andRaman (2012) find that clients inmore concentratedmarkets (measured
at the MSA level) are more likely to use discretionary accruals to beat analyst forecasts. Further, in an international
sample of public-client audits, Francis et al. (2013) find that audit quality decreases with concentration of Big N audit
firms’ market share. Finally, using data from the Chinese public-client audit market, Huang et al. (2016) show that con-
centration (measured at the city level) has a negative direct effect on audit quality, but an offsetting positive indirect
effect through increased audit fees.
Recalling the above discussion of estimation bias in studies examining the price and quality effects of audit mar-
ket concentration, we posit that a plausible explanation for the inconclusiveness of prior studies is that their findings
dependonhoweffectively they control for audit complexity. That is, these studies’ focus onpublicly listed clients brings
along the risk that sampled clients’ complexity is systematically associatedwithmarket concentration. Furthermore, it
is intuitive to expect that sampled clients’ complexity systematically correlates with actual audit quality. Therefore,
also when analyzing the relationship between market concentration and audit quality, our focus on the SME segment
of the audit market, where clients have a low demand for technology- and resource-intensive audits, helps to reduce
estimation bias.
We expect that in the presence of low audit complexity, market concentration reduces audit quality via two chan-
nels. First, audit firms may exercise their market power in concentrated audit markets by economizing on audit effort,
as has been argued by regulators worldwide. This idea is consistent with standard economic theory arguing that com-
petition has a positive effect onquality (e.g., Leland, 1977;Mussa&Rosen, 1978; Spence, 1975). Specifically, in compet-
itive environments, audit firms have an incentive to provide high-quality audits to build and maintain their reputation
with clients. Audit firms may compete on quality rather than price, especially when low balling is discouraged through
regulation, as in the Belgian setting. In accordance with this notion, Copley and Doucet (1993) find that the number of
soliciting bids for a US governmental audit engagement is positively associated with the ultimate quality of the audit.
Similarly, examining internal data of one audit firm, Johnstone, Bedard, and Ettredge (2004) show that in a competi-
tive bidding environment the audit firm plans more audit hours while charging lower fees. Second, price competition
in audit markets with low concentrationmay stimulate clients to substitute (presumablymore effective) external audit
services for internal controls (Simunic, 1980) and, consequently, increase the scope and quality of the audit.We there-
fore test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2 Audit market concentration is negatively associated with audit quality in the SME audit market
segment.
A potential factor working against Hypothesis 2 is that auditors may respond to market fragmentation-induced
competition by allocating fewer resources to clients in market segments where such competition induces price cuts
(Hermanson, Dykes, & Turner, 1987; Kranton, 2003). This would harm auditor competence and, in turn, reduce audit
qualitywhenmarket concentration is low.11 This negative effect of price competitiononaudit quality is especially likely
to occur if audit quality is difficult to observe or if high audit fee transparency strengthens the relationship between
audit fees and auditor effort, as we argued to be the case in Belgium.
11Enforcementbodies’ explicit focusonpublicly held clients’ audits reflects thatminimumaudit quality standards are less strictly enforced in theprivate-client
segmentof the auditmarket. Consequently, auditorsmayhavemorediscretion in choosing audit quality levels and competitionmaymore freely influence audit
quality in the private-client segment.
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We further note that regulation can potentially moderate the effect of audit market competition on audit quality.
Audit markets are regulated to assure a minimum quality level by means of, for example, educational requirements,
licensing andmandatory peer reviews (Yardley, Kauffman, Cairney, & Albrecht, 1992). If effective, minimum standards
narrow the range of quality levels that auditors can provide. Although this effect potentially intensifies competition, on
average, by reducing auditors’ opportunities for quality differentiation (Ronnen, 1991), it will likely weaken the rela-
tionship between audit market concentration and audit quality andwork against Hypothesis 2.
3.2 Clientmobility
Our analysis of the relationship between auditmarket concentration and audit pricing or quality is largelymotivatedby
regulators’ concern that high degrees of concentration prevent competition among audit firms. In the previous section
we argued that, under an alternative view, high market concentration can endogenously arise when audit firms strive
for economies of scale (or scope) and resource optimization in the complex-audit segment of themarket. In this light, an
important question iswhether also at higher levels of audit complexity, when clients require technology- and resource-
intensive audits, audit firms still can and do compete on price or quality. If so, this could potentially alleviate regulators’
concern. To examine this issue, we turn to an alternative, dynamic measure of market structure.
Industrial organization theory (see, e.g., Carlton & Perloff, 1994) argues that seller concentration is a static mea-
sure ofmarket structure and a potential driver of competition but does not necessarily reflect the actual rivalry among
suppliers in amarket. Measures ofmarket dynamics, such asmarket sharemobility, capture such rivalry, and therefore
complement static measures in accurately reflecting market competition (Baldwin & Gorecki, 1998). The industrial
organization literature thus explicitly recognizes the possibility that also concentrated audit markets can be competi-
tive, for example, if a number of similarly sized firms share themarket but lack sufficient opportunity to differentiate or
coordinate. In contrast, most prior studies on auditmarket competition have relied on staticmeasures ofmarket struc-
ture only and have thus ignored a potentially important dimension of audit market competition. A notable exception is
Buijink et al. (1998), who demonstrate that also in concentrated audit markets, market dynamics can cause significant
fluctuations in market shares, which seemingly suggests that concentratedmarkets can be competitive.
Following Buijink et al. (1998), we derive a dynamic measure of competition from the temporal variation in audit
firms’ individual market shares. We refer to this measure as client mobility. If client mobility indeed results from audit
market competition, the conventional theoretical prediction that competition helps to reduce monopoly rents implies
that client mobility and audit fees must be negatively associated. We therefore use the strength of the negative rela-
tionship between clientmobility and audit fees as ameasure of price competition intensity. Earlierwe argued that large
clients’ audit complexity and demand for technology- and resource-intensive audits stimulates market share concen-
tration in the large-client segment of the audit market. If audit complexity indeed prevents price competition, through
its effect on audit demands and market structure, we predict that such complexity weakens the negative association
between client mobility and audit fees in the large-client segment, as compared to the SME-client segment. We thus
test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3 The negative association between clientmobility and audit fees is more pronounced in the SMEmarket
segment than in the large-client market segment.
If audit quality is sufficiently valued by clients, client mobility can have a positive effect on audit quality for at least
two reasons that we discussed earlier. First, a competition-induced reduction in audit prices may stimulate clients to
replace internal controls with (presumably more effective) external audit services (Simunic, 1980). Second, standard
economic theory predicts that in competitive audit markets, audit firms improve the quality of their audits to build and
maintain their reputation.
Building on these arguments, we expect that audit firms have an incentive to compete on quality and that, absent
constraints on competition, client mobility and audit quality are positively associated. Analogous to our measurement
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TABLE 1 Sample selection
No. of Obs.
A) Initial sample 47,284
Less: Observations withmissing total assets (4,788)
Observations withmissing auditor data (3,375)
Observations withmissing coordinates (204)
Observations withmultiple audit partners (2,123) (10,490)
B) Sample used to computemeasures of market structure 36,794
Less: Listed companies (208)
Financial and public institutions (3,413)
Observations withmissing financial information (12,433)
Observations withmissing audit fees (4,196)
Observations with extreme changes in total assets (769) (21,019)
C) Sample used in the regression analyses 15,775
of price competition, explained above, we therefore use the strength of the positive relationship between clientmobil-
ity and audit quality as a measure of quality competition intensity. We predict that if higher levels of audit complexity
in the large-client segment prevent quality competition through their effect onmarket structure, this would cause the
association between client mobility and audit quality to be less positive in the large-client market segment. We there-
fore test the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4 The positive association between client mobility and audit quality is more pronounced in the SMEmar-
ket segment than in the large-client market segment.
4 SAMPLE AND METHODOLOGY
4.1 Sample selection
Financial statement data of Belgian client firms and the names of the audit firm and the audit engagement partner,
the individual auditor signing the audit report, come from the Bel-First database. This database contains financial data
of all companies that are legally required to have their accounts audited by an independent auditor and submitted to
the National Bank of Belgium. The completeness in coverage of this database allows us to reconstruct close to com-
plete client portfolios of all Belgian audit firms and audit partners. We use Google Earth to determine the geographic
coordinates of client locations and define local audit markets.
The initial sample, which we label sample A for ease of reference in Table 1, consists of 47,284 client-year obser-
vations for the fiscal years 2006 to 2011. As summarized in Table 1, we exclude from the sample 4,788 observations
withmissing current or lagged total assets (measuring client size), 3,375 observations for which the audit firm name or
audit partner name are missing, 204 observations with missing audit partner or client location data, and 2,123 obser-
vations identifying more than one audit partner. Exclusion of these observations results in a sample of 36,794 obser-
vations (16,007 unique companies), which we refer to as sample B. We use sample B to compute the audit market
structuremeasures.
When calculating measures of audit quality (and the control variables), we exclude 208 observations pertaining to
publicly traded companies, and 3,413 observations of financial and public institutions, because of their specific audit
requirements and accounting procedures, as well as 12,433 observations with missing accounting data. The effect of
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missing accounting data on sample size is substantial because some of the smallest companies in our initial sample
are legally allowed to report abbreviated financial statements. Furthermore, we remove 4,196 observations for which
audit fee data is missing.12 Finally, we exclude 769 observations with extreme changes in total assets.13
The final sample (referred to as sample C in Table 1), which we use to examine the effect of audit market structure
on audit quality and audit pricing, contains 15,775 client-year observations (of 8,122 unique client firms).
4.2 Market structuremeasures
In this studyweexamine twodimensions of auditmarket structure: (1)market share concentration and (2) clientmobil-
ity.We distinguish audit markets by geographical area and client size. In particular, we define the audit market of client
i as the collection of auditor-client combinations within a 50-km radius of client i (as observed in sample B), where we
require that all clients in a local market are in the same quartile of total assets (centered around client i).14
Our measure of audit market concentration is the average of two measures. The first measure is the Herfindahl
market concentration index, which we compute as follows:
Herfindahl Indexkt =
L∑
l=1
[
Market Sharelkt
]2
(1)
where Market Sharelkt denotes the market share of audit firm l and L is the total number of audit firms competing in
market k and year t. In equation 2wemeasure audit firms’ log-assets weightedmarket shares as:
Market Sharelkt =
∑I
i=1 [ln(Assetsi) × Dil]∑I
i=1 [ln(Assetsi)]
(2)
where ln(Assetsi) is the natural log of total assets of client i in market k,Dil is an indicator variable that is equal to one if
audit firm l audits client i’s financial statements, and I is the total number of clients in market k and year t.15
Measuring the Herfindahl index at the audit firm level takes into account that audit partners can create market
power by joining forces in a partnership. A potential limitation of theHerfindahl index is that it also captures situations
where auditors operate under a joint umbrella partnership without realizing synergies in the form of a competitive
advantage or economies of scale. To ensure that ourmeasure of auditmarket concentration reflects de facto synergetic
concentration rather than pro forma concentration, we combine theHerfindahl indexwith a secondmeasure capturing
the size of individual audit partners’ client portfolios. By doing so, we assume that the increase in efficiency or market
power that results from increased market share concentration helps audit partners to effectively increase their client
span.We calculate partners’ average portfolio size as follows:
Portfolio Sizekt =
1
P
I∑
i=1
ln(Assetsi) (3)
where P is the total number of audit partners in market k.
12Untabulated t-tests indicate that observations with missing audit fee data are significantly smaller (at the 1% level) than observations for which audit fee
data is available.
13We define companies with extreme changes in firm size as those companies for which total assets increased by more than 100% or decreased by more
than 50%.
14We determine clients’ geographic coordinates based on postal codes and use these coordinates to compute the geographic distance between local audit
offices and clients. We find that close to 75% of all clients (in sample B) are located within a 50-km distance of their auditor. This observation leads us to
assume that a 50-km radius circle around a client provides a reasonable approximation of the client’s local audit market. Our results remain qualitatively
similar if we define local audit markets using different cut-offs.
15While acknowledging that audit fees are the conceptually preferred input to the calculation of market shares, we use total assets instead because this
allows us to calculate market shares (and derive competition measures) for the total audit market rather than only for a subset of firms for which audit fees
are available. We do so under the reasonable assumption that firm size, as proxied by total assets, is the primary driver of audit fees. We log-transform total
assets to account for the non-linearity in the total assets–audit fee relationship.
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In accordance with the notion that concentration helps audit partners to increase efficiency or market power, we
find that the Herfindahl Index and Portfolio Size exhibit a strong positive association (𝜌 = 0.73). Given the high cor-
relation between both measures, we construct a composite score based on the average of the two variables, after
standardizing the variables to zero mean and unit standard deviation. This score, which we label Market Concen-
tration, is constructed in such a way that lower values reflect reduced concentration and smaller average portfolio
sizes.
In prior audit research, concentration of auditors’ market shares has been the dominant measure of competition
(e.g., Pearson&Trompeter, 1994; Simunic, 1980). However, aswe discussed in section 3, concentration is likely to be an
incompletemeasure of competition (Pearson & Trompeter, 1994; Yardley et al., 1992). Year-to-year changes inmarket
shares better capture the competitive dynamics in an audit market segment (Buijink et al., 1998; Yardley et al., 1992).
Following Caves and Porter (1978) and Buijink et al. (1998), we therefore use the instability of audit firms’ market
shares as a positive measure of competition. This measure, which we label Client Mobility, is calculated as the sum of
the absolute values of the annual percentage-point changes in market share for each audit firm in a local audit market:
ClientMobilitykt =
L∑
l=1
|Market Sharelk,t −Market Sharelk,t−1| (4)
whereMarket Sharelkt is as defined in equation 2.
4.3 Audit qualitymeasure
Audit qualitymanifests itself in potentiallymany different forms. Prior research has, for example,measured audit qual-
ity as the number of court decisions against deficient auditors (e.g., Palmrose, 1988), the frequency of earnings restate-
ments (Francis,Michas, & Yu, 2013; Kinney, Palmrose, & Scholz, 2004; Raghunandan, Read, &Whisenant, 2003), or the
likelihood of qualified audit opinions (e.g., Hopwood,McKeown, &Mutchler, 1994; Vanstraelen, 2000; Zhang, Xu, Tong,
& Ye, 2018). In accordance with a large selection of prior studies, the premise of our empirical tests is that high-quality
audits constrain earnings management and thus reduce abnormal accruals in magnitude (e.g., Becker et al., 1998;
Francis, Stokes, & Anderson, 1999; Krishnan, 2003; Myers, Myers, & Omer, 2003; Reynolds & Francis, 2001). In
particular, we use client firms’ accrual quality as the operational measure of audit quality, measuring accrual quality
as the absolute values of abnormal accruals estimated using the modified Jones model (see Jones, 1991 and Dechow
et al., 1995).
Discretionary accruals aremeasured using the residuals (𝜖it) from the following regression equation:
Taccit = 𝛽0it + 𝛽1it
1
Ait−1
+ 𝛽2it(ΔSalesit − ΔReceivablesit) + 𝛽3itPP&Eit + 𝛽4itROAit + 𝜖it (5)
where Tacc denotes total accruals (of client i in year t),Δ Sales is the year-to-year change in sales,Δ Receivables is the
year-to-year change in accounts receivable, PP&E denotes end-of-year property, plant and equipment (all scaled by
lagged total assets), and ROA is return on assets. Following, for example, Dechow et al. (1995) and Leuz et al. (2003),
wemeasure total accruals as the change in non-cash current assetsminus the change in current liabilities (adjusted for
short-term debt and income taxes payable) minus depreciation.We include ROA in equation 5 to control for the effect
of performance on accruals (Ashbaugh et al., 2003; Kothari, Leone, & Wasley, 2005). We estimate equation 5 by year
and size group following Ecker, Francis, Olsson, and Schipper (2013). Specifically, for each client-year it we define its
size group as all client-years jt that are included in the decile of total assets that is centered around client-year it.
While we follow several prior studies on private-client audit quality by using the magnitude of discretionary accru-
als tomeasure audit quality (e.g., Ajona et al., 2008; Bauwhede &Willekens, 2004; Van Tendeloo &Vanstraelen, 2008),
we acknowledge that no single measure of audit quality is without measurement error. DeFond and Zhang (2014)
argue that the strength of the relationship between discretionary accruals, or financial reporting quality, and audit
quality depends on the quality of a firm’s financial reporting system, or pre-audit accounting quality, and innate firm
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characteristics. In our study, we therefore include several control variables, which we discuss in more detail below, to
account for cross-sectional variation in innate firm characteristics. Just as importantly, we emphasize that our theory
implies the assumption that audit quality is equal for two firms only if the auditor can also overcome any differences in
the quality of the firms’ financial reporting systems. For example, we explicitly recognize that SME clients may require
a different audit approach than large clients and that the audit market for SME clients therefore may have a different
structure than themarket for large clients.
A particular risk of using discretionary accruals to measure audit quality is that discretionary accruals can only be
estimated with noise (see, e.g., Dechow et al., 1995; Hribar & Collins, 2002; Owens, Wu, & Zimmerman, 2017). Where
such noise correlates with innate firm characteristics, such as firm growth, profitability, or operating cycle length, the
control variables included in the regressions help to neutralize its effect on the empirical findings. Furthermore, rely-
ing on the finding of Peek, Meuwissen, Moers, and Vanstraelen (2013) that discretionary accruals estimates are less
noisy in samples with low earnings timeliness and low accrual intensity, we argue that the risk of estimation error is
less severe in a sample of private clients, who typically have lower earnings timeliness and make less use of accruals
than public clients. Nonetheless, the above potential limitations of discretionary accruals estimates should be seen as
a caveat when interpreting our findings.
4.4 Regressionmodels
To examine the effect of competition on audit fees or audit quality and test our hypotheses we estimate the following
regression equation:
Ln(Audit Fees)it or |DA |it = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1Market Concentrationkt + 𝛽2ClientMobilitykt +
∑
z
𝛽zControlsit +
∑
𝛾
Year
+
∑
𝛿
Industry + 𝜖 (6)
where Ln(Audit Fees) is the natural logarithm of client i’s audit fees in year t, |DA| equals the absolute value of discre-
tionary accruals defined above, Market Concentration and Client Mobility reflect our market structure measures as
described in section 4.2, Controls is a vector of client-year specific control variables, and Year and Industry are year
and industry fixed effects.16
Because the sample includes multiple observations per client, potentially causing cross-sectional dependence, we
cluster standard errors by client in all regressions. Further, following prior literature, we control for several client-
specific determinants of audit fees and abnormal accruals when testing our hypotheses (see, e.g., Hay, Knechel, & Li,
2006, Hay, Knechel, & Wong, 2006). In particular, because prior research suggests that the magnitude of abnormal
accruals increases with operating volatility and growth, we control for the natural logarithm of client age (ln(Age)) and
the percentage change in total assets (Growth). We further include an indicator variable for Big Four audit firms (Big
Four) to control for pricing differences and the possibility that Big Four audit firms provide higher-quality audits due
to reputation concerns (e.g., DeAngelo, 1981).17 To control for differences in reporting incentives and accrual quality
related to financial distress, we include the total debt-to-total assets ratio (Leverage), the natural logarithm of total
assets (Size), a bankruptcy risk indicator variable (Bankruptcy Risk) based on the bankruptcy prediction model by
Ooghe and Verbaere (1982), Return on Assets (ROA), and an indicator variable for operating losses in the prior fis-
cal year (Operating Loss).18 We control for industry expertise using an indicator variable that is equal to one if the
16To make the coefficients on Market Concentration and Client Mobility easily comparable, both variables have been standardized to zero mean and unit
standard deviation before estimating the regression.
17The group of Big Four firms consists of Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PwC. Lennox (1999) shows analytically that the Big Four quality effect is mainly
driven by litigation concerns, not reputation concerns. It is thus unclear ex-ante whether Big Four is positively associated with audit quality in a setting with
low litigation risk.
18Bankruptcy Risk equals one for firms with increased bankruptcy risk. The bankruptcy prediction model by Ooghe and Verbaere (1982) has been specif-
ically developed for Belgian companies. It includes the following ratios: accumulated profit (loss) and reserves/total liabilities; taxes and social security
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audit firm is the top-ranked or second-ranked firm within a 2-digit NACE industry, measured at the national level and
based on audit fees. We also control for the amount of intangible assets scaled by total assets (Intangibles), the num-
ber of industries in which a client operates (Diversification) and an indicator variable that is equal to one if the client
is located in Belgium’s largest metropolitan areas, Brussels or Antwerp (Metropolis). Finally, we include year and (two-
digit NACE-Rev.2) industry fixed effects.19
When testing hypotheses 1 and 3, which focus on the relationship between audit market structure and audit fees,
we add twovariables to the vector of controls. First, we control for the ratio of receivables and inventory to total assets
(Receivables & Inventories). Receivables and inventories are presumably difficult to audit, require extensive auditor
judgment, and often result in misstatements. These items therefore increase audit risk and justify higher audit fees
(Feroz, Park, & Pastena, 1991; Francis & Reynolds, 2001; Gaeremynck & Willekens, 2003; Hay et al., 2006; Krishnan
& Krishnan, 1997; Simunic, 1980). Second, we include the ratio of current assets less inventory over current liabili-
ties (Quick Ratio) to control for the effect of liquidity. Companies with a low liquidity ratio face a higher risk of short-
term insolvency and financial distress (Francis & Reynolds, 2001). Because prior research has shown that audit firms
price such risk (e.g. Davis, Ricchiute, & Trompeter, 1993; Johnstone & Bedard, 2001), we expect a negative association
betweenQuick Ratio and audit fees.
When testing hypotheses 2 and 4, which focus on the relationship between audit market structure and audit
(accrual) quality, we add the natural logarithm of the length of the operating cycle (ln(Operating Cycle Length)) to the
vector of controls. Following Burgstahler, Hail, and Leuz (2006), we measure the length of the operating cycle as the
sum of average days receivables and average days inventories.
We conclude that Market Concentration (Client Mobility) increases audit fees or worsens audit quality if 𝛽1 (𝛽2) in
equation 6 is significantly greater than zero. To test the hypotheses, we estimate equation 6 for SMEs and large enter-
prises separately. Constrained by our data, we define large enterprises using a simplified version of the size criteria
used in the Fourth EUAccounting Directive and in effect during our sample period. In particular, sample firms denoted
as large enterprises have (1) a balance sheet total greater than €17.5million and (2) revenues in excess of €35million.20
5 RESULTS
5.1 Descriptive statistics
In this study, we focus on local audit markets, as we argued earlier. Table 2 shows the empirical distribution of auditor-
client distances in our sample. The distribution illustrates that around three-quarters of all clients have an auditor that
is located within a radius of 50 km (or 31 miles) of the client. This observation confirms that Belgian private clients
hire their auditors locally and provides support for our choice to examine local rather than national measures of mar-
ket structure.
Table 3 displays descriptive statistics of audit fees, accrual quality, audit market structure, and control variables.21
While average audit fees amount to € 14,444, there is substantial variation in audit fees, which presumably reflects
charges/short-term external liabilities; cash/restricted current assets; work in progress and finished goods/restricted current assets; short-term financial
debts/short-term external liabilities. The optimal cut-off point of 0.1304 is used to distinguish companies with a high bankruptcy risk from clients with a low
bankruptcy risk (Ooghe, Joos, & De Bourdeaudhuij, 1995).
19Due to data limitations, we are unable to include some of the control variables that have been used in public-client studies, such as non-audit fees, office
size, and auditor tenure.
20During our sample period the Fourth EUAccounting Directive defined large enterprises as thosemeeting at least two out of the following three criteria: (1)
balance sheet total> € 17.5million; (2) revenues> € 35million, and (3) number of employees> 250.
21Variables other than the market structure measures, log-transformed measures and indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom percentile to
mitigate the potential impact of outliers.
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TABLE 2 Empirical distribution of auditor-client distances
Auditor-client distance
in kilometers (miles) No. of observations Cumulative percentage
10 (6.21) 10,847 29.48%
20 (12.43) 15,721 42.73%
30 (18.64) 19,205 52.20%
40 (24.85) 23,548 64.00%
50 (31.07) 27,005 73.40%
60 (37.28) 29,886 81.23%
70 (43.50) 31,510 85.64%
80 (49.71) 32,863 89.32%
90 (55.92) 34,356 93.37%
100 (62.14) 35,434 96.30%
110 (68.35) 35,884 97.53%
120 (74.56) 36,340 98.77%
Total 36,794 100.00%
Notes: This table displays the empirical distribution of auditor-client distances in the sample used to compute measures of
market structure (i.e., sample B). Distances shown are the straight-line distances between clients’ and auditors’ geographic
coordinates, both determined using Google Earth.
the sample variation in client size and audit complexity.22 Absolute discretionary accruals are, on average, 10.9% of
beginning-of-year total assets, which is consistent with prior research (e.g. Reynolds & Francis, 2001). The Herfindahl
concentrationmeasure has amean of 0.075, which is indicative of a loose oligopoly (Shepherd & Shepherd, 2003). The
average concentration ratio is lower than concentration ratios commonly reported in prior US studies (e.g., Tomczyk &
Read, 1989). This difference likely results from our focus on the private-client segment of the audit market (see, e.g.,
Dopuch & Simunic, 1980) as well as distinctive features of the Belgian audit market (see section 2). Client Mobility is,
on average, 0.27, which is in line with client mobility levels observed in prior research focusing on Germany and the
Netherlands (Buijink et al., 1998) and implies that auditors lose an average annual total of 13.5% (0.27/2) of market
share to their competitors. The observed within-country variation in market structure measures confirms the need to
examine thesemeasures at a local rather than national level.
Clients in the sample have an average age of 26 years and an average size, measured in total assets, of
€62.4million.23 The financial risk of the average client seemsmoderately high,which is presumably due to our focus on
smaller, private clients. In fact, clients have an average leverage ratio of 65.7%; 20.7% of the clients have an increased
risk of bankruptcy, and 21.9% have an operating loss in the prior year. Finally, 48.3% of the clients are audited by a Big
Four audit firm and 33.2% of the clients are audited by an industry expert.
We furthermore study to what extent clients in the SME segment differ from larger clients. The last column of
Table 3 shows the difference in means between these two market segments. Most notably, we observe that, on aver-
age, larger clients pay higher audit fees, have lower discretionary accruals, are older, show higher growth in assets, are
financially healthier, and aremore likely to be audited by a Big 4 audit firm.
To provide insight into the relationship between client size—an observable driver of audit complexity—and audit
market structure, Table 4 reports the mean values of client size, three market structure measures, audit fees and
absolute abnormal accruals for each of 15 client size groups. The first 10 size groups include client firms that we
22Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the natural logarithm of audit fees. Average audit fees are computed based on the same sample (i.e. sample C),
but are not reported in Table 3 for the sake of brevity.
23Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics for the natural logarithm of total assets (i.e. Size). Average total assets are computed based on the same sample (i.e.
sample C), but are not reported in Table 3 for the sake of brevity.
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TABLE 3 Descriptive statistics
Full sample SME clients Large clients
Variables Mean Median Std. Dev P1 Q1 Q3 P99 Mean Mean Diff.
ln(Audit Fees) 2.145 2.079 0.939 0.000 1.609 2.708 4.727 1.853 2.787 0.934***
| DA| 0.109 0.068 0.121 0.001 0.030 0.138 0.620 0.115 0.095 −0.020***
Herfindahl Index 0.075 0.067 0.030 0.035 0.055 0.088 0.162 0.062 0.105 0.043***
Portfolio Size 24.532 21.882 10.118 10.096 17.276 29.075 53.980 20.733 32.889 12.156***
ClientMobility 0.266 0.258 0.058 0.139 0.230 0.300 0.433 0.266 0.268 0.002
Age 26.281 22.000 18.309 4.000 13.000 35.000 89.000 24.369 30.487 6.118***
Growth 0.044 0.021 0.214 −0.440−0.069 0.136 0.803 0.035 0.064 0.029***
Size 9.070 8.969 1.616 5.525 8.102 9.932 13.657 8.259 10.856 2.598***
Leverage 0.657 0.669 0.336 0.024 0.430 0.843 2.105 0.665 0.638 −0.026***
Bankruptcy Risk 0.207 0.000 0.405 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.211 0.197 −0.014∗
Operating Loss 0.219 0.000 0.413 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.233 0.186 −0.047***
ROA 0.029 0.028 0.125 −0.532−0.001 0.078 0.434 0.028 0.032 0.004∗
Big Four 0.483 0.000 0.500 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.433 0.595 0.162***
Intangibles 0.016 0.000 0.053 0.000 0.000 0.005 0.364 0.015 0.020 0.006***
Diversification 2.032 2.000 0.853 1.000 1.000 3.000 4.000 2.025 2.048 0.024
Metropolis 0.261 0.000 0.439 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.243 0.301 0.058***
Industry Expert 0.332 0.000 0.471 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 0.290 0.424 0.134***
Quick Ratio 2.029 1.108 3.616 0.039 0.709 1.830 28.037 1.990 2.115 0.125
Receivables & Inventories 0.420 0.416 0.286 0.000 0.161 0.654 0.967 0.438 0.380 −0.058***
Operating Cycle Length 106.500 84.834 85.314 0.000 52.205 130.916 429.189 104.759 110.329 5.570***
Notes: This table displays descriptive statistics for sample C, which is used in the regression analyses (n = 15,775). Variables
are defined in the appendix. All variables with the exception of market structure measures, log transformed variables, and
indicator variables are winsorized at the top and bottom 1%. ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively
(two-tailed). Difference tests are based on t-tests assuming unequal variances.
classify as small and medium-sized; the other five size groups include client firms classified as large. The group
averages show a positive association between client size and the Herfindahl Index, a positive measure of market
concentration, especially in the large-client market segment. This observation is consistent with the notion that
market share concentration arises as a response to the technology, efficiency, network, and quality requirements
of complex large-client audits (e.g., Danos & Eichenseher, 1982; Dopuch & Simunic, 1980; Sirois & Simunic, 2011).
Likewise, average Portfolio Size is highest in the large-client segment, which confirms the notion that concentration
in this segment is synergetic, improving the efficacy of audit firms’ investments in audit technology and specialist
skills. Although Client Mobility seems slightly below average for the smallest and largest clients in the sample, we
find no clear relationship between client size and Client Mobility. We could cautiously interpret this observation as
indicating that audit complexity does not prevent client mobility. Finally, we find that audit fees increase with client
size, whereas abnormal absolute accruals—our inverse proxy for audit quality—decrease with client size. Overall,
the results displayed in Table 4 confirm the relevance of accounting for client size when examining the relationship
between audit market concentration, audit fees, and audit quality.
Table 5 displays Pearson correlations among audit fees, accrual quality, audit market structure, and control vari-
ables. The univariate correlation between the audit market structure measures Herfindahl Index and Portfolio Size is
positive and economically significant. Client Mobility is negatively and weakly correlated with Herfindahl Index, while
its correlation with Portfolio Size is negligible. These observations confirm that Herfindahl Index and Portfolio Size
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TABLE 4 Relationship between audit complexity, audit market structure, audit fees, and audit quality
Size
Group
Size
Category
Mean
Total Assets
Mean
Herfindahl
Index
Mean
Portfolio
Size
Mean
Client
Mobility
Mean
Audit Fees
Mean
|DA|
1 SME client 510.753 0.066 14.546 0.236 4.405 0.157
2 SME client 1266.266 0.065 16.726 0.246 6.103 0.135
3 SME client 2129.101 0.062 17.665 0.262 6.973 0.129
4 SME client 3139.520 0.060 18.834 0.271 8.159 0.119
5 SME client 4269.774 0.057 20.368 0.270 8.374 0.114
6 SME client 5415.183 0.055 21.337 0.275 8.697 0.099
7 SME client 6737.173 0.057 22.643 0.274 8.755 0.096
8 SME client 8404.235 0.059 23.316 0.277 9.717 0.101
9 SME client 10757.890 0.064 24.894 0.277 10.915 0.099
10 SME client 14435.790 0.074 27.008 0.272 12.147 0.102
11 Large client 16150.390 0.076 27.900 0.273 13.394 0.100
12 Large client 24963.580 0.092 32.082 0.274 17.078 0.096
13 Large client 38948.680 0.108 35.773 0.272 18.748 0.088
14 Large client 75743.330 0.118 34.976 0.262 28.168 0.092
15 Large client 779697.700 0.133 33.712 0.258 61.045 0.098
Notes: This table displays the average values of client size, market structuremeasures, audit fees and absolute abnormal accru-
als for 15 size groups. Size category indicates whether a company is classified as a small or medium-sized client (SME client)
or as a large client. Within each size category, size groups are equally-sized. All variables are as defined in the appendix. The
sample used in this table is sample C (n = 15,775).
measure a similar underlying factor, whereas Client Mobility reflects a separate dimension of market structure. The
positive correlation between ln(Audit Fees), Herfindahl Index and Portfolio Size suggests that auditors charge higher
fees in more concentrated audit markets. Similarly, the negative correlation between ln(Audit Fees) and Client Mobil-
ity provides initial evidence that Client Mobility intensifies price competition. Examining the correlations among the
market structure measures and our measure of audit quality, we find (weak) initial evidence of positive associations
between audit quality and (a) Herfindahl Index, (b) Portfolio Size, and (c) Client Mobility. However, we caution the
reader not to over-interpret these univariate correlations as they ignore, for example, the influence of audit complexity
on the association betweenmarket structure and audit quality.
5.2 Hypotheses tests
5.2.1 Hypotheses 1 and 2:Market concentration
Table 6 displays the results of the regression analyses examining the relationship between audit market structure and
audit fees. Columns 1 and 2 display coefficient estimates for SME clients and large clients separately. Column 3 shows
the regression results for the full sample, primarily for reasons of completeness. The coefficients on the control vari-
ables in Table 6 are generally intuitive and in line with prior research. Audit firms charge higher fees to older, low-
growth, and large clients, clients with high inventories and receivables or intangibles, and clients that operate in multi-
ple industries. They also price clients’ business and financial risk, as indicated by the positive coefficients onOperating
Loss, Bankruptcy Risk, Leverage (SME clients only) as well as the negative coefficient onQuick Ratio. Further, industry
experts and large audit firms charge a significant price premium, the latter ones presumably to compensate them for
brand name and reputation. Finally, audit fees are lower for large clients that are located in the metropolitan areas of
Antwerp or Brussels.
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TABLE 6 Regression analyses of the relationship between audit market structure and audit fees
SME clients
(N = 10,845)
Large clients
(N = 4,930)
All clients
(N = 15,775)
(1) (2) (3)
Market Concentration 0.122*** 0.098*** 0.106***
(5.840) (4.669) (7.380)
ClientMobility −0.017** −0.033** −0.026***
(−2.137) (−2.308) (−3.937)
ln(Age) 0.058*** 0.111*** 0.077***
(4.408) (5.399) (6.813)
Growth −0.164*** −0.107* −0.156***
(−5.927) (−1.940) (−6.149)
Size 0.268*** 0.339*** 0.290***
(28.926) (18.141) (32.352)
Leverage 0.145*** 0.082 0.142***
(5.006) (1.268) (5.144)
Bankruptcy Risk 0.092*** 0.038 0.077***
(4.109) (1.034) (3.882)
Operating Loss 0.069*** 0.068** 0.069***
(3.994) (2.097) (4.305)
ROA 0.095 −0.074 0.070
(1.607) (−0.478) (1.220)
Big Four 0.459*** 0.601*** 0.514***
(22.313) (16.884) (28.283)
Intangibles 0.634*** 0.854*** 0.737***
(3.523) (3.058) (4.788)
Diversification 0.029*** 0.023 0.024***
(2.897) (1.345) (2.655)
Metropolis 0.016 −0.137*** −0.031
(0.723) (−3.596) (−1.571)
Industry Expert 0.123*** 0.202*** 0.160***
(6.567) (6.749) (9.780)
Quick Ratio −0.010*** −0.018*** −0.013***
(−3.884) (−4.117) (−5.357)
Receivables & Inventories 0.299*** 0.424*** 0.304***
(8.128) (6.099) (8.951)
Large Client −0.040
(−1.591)
Constant −1.028*** −1.830*** −1.272***
(−6.449) (−6.649) (−8.741)
R-Squared 39.09% 53.08% 55.33%
F-Value 2,313.92*** 197.18*** 90.72***
Notes: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed). t-Values are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered by client firm. Fixed effects for years and industries are included but not tabulated for reasons of brevity.
The dependent variable in the regressions is the natural logarithm of Audit Fees. Variables are defined in the appendix.
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To test Hypothesis 1, i.e., that audit market concentration is positively associated with audit fees in the SME-client
segment, we focus on the coefficient on Market Concentration in column 1. We find that this coefficient is positive
and statistically significant at the 1% level (𝛽 = 0.122, t = 5.840). This finding supports Hypothesis 1 and confirms that
market fragmentation spurs price competition. The relationship betweenMarket Concentration and audit fees is also
positive and statistically significant at the 1% level in the large-client segment, as shown in column 2 (𝛽 = 0.098, t =
4.669). Untabulated tests show that the coefficients onMarket Concentration in columns 1 and 2 are not significantly
different from each other. As we argued in section 3, it is reasonable to assume that market concentration in the large-
client segment is at least partly endogenous to audit complexity-driven investments in audit technology and resources.
Consequently, the coefficient on Market Concentration in column 2 may be subject to estimation bias. We therefore
refrain from interpreting differences in the coefficients onMarket Concentration between the SME-client sample and
the large-client sample. While we will discuss the coefficients on Client Mobility in Table 6 later, when we address
Hypothesis 3, we now first turn to Table 7 to address Hypothesis 2, which predicts a negative association between
audit market concentration and audit quality in the SME-client segment.
Table 7 displays the coefficient estimates of the regression examining the relationship between audit market struc-
ture and audit quality. Columns 1, 2, and 3 show the results for SME clients, large clients, and the full sample, respec-
tively. The audit qualitymeasure examined in each regression is the absolutemagnitude of Jones (1991) abnormal total
accruals. The coefficients on the control variables displayed in Table 7 are generally in line with expectations and prior
research. Audit quality is higher for clients with lower operating volatility, i.e., clients that are larger, less diversified,
less intangibles-intensive, andmoremature andhave lower growth. Further, poorly performing, financially constrained
clients, as reflected by Leverage, Bankruptcy Risk, and Operating Loss, report larger discretionary accruals (see, e.g.,
DeAngelo &DeAngelo, 1994). A surprising finding is that the coefficient on Big Four is positive. This finding is inconsis-
tentwith the traditional idea of Big Four quality differentiation (e.g. Becker et al., 1998) but adds to themixed evidence
that is available for private clients (e.g. Bauwhede et al., 2003; Bauwhede &Willekens, 2004; Svanström, 2013; Langli
& Svanström, 2014).24 Finally, we find no quality differences between metropolitan and non-metropolitan audits or
evidence that industry experts provide higher quality audits.
Our test of Hypothesis 2 focuses on the coefficient on Market Concentration in column 1. We find that this coeffi-
cient is positive and significant at the 5% level (𝛽 =0.007, t=2.014). This finding indicates that market concentration in
the SME-client segment reduces audit quality, which confirms the prediction ofHypothesis 2. Earlierwe discussed two
plausible explanations for such a finding. First, audit firms that havemarket power in a concentratedmarketmay econ-
omize on quality, whereas audit firms in fragmented, competitive markets may improve quality to build and maintain
their reputation. Second, price cuts in fragmented, competitive markets may stimulate clients’ demand for audit ser-
vices and, consequently, increase the scope and quality of the audit. Our finding is inconsistentwith the notion that the
rent-reducing effect of price competition in fragmented audit markets stimulates audit firms to economize on quality.
A noteworthy finding is that the coefficient on Market Concentration for large clients, displayed in column 2 of
Table 7, is negative and not significantly different from zero (𝛽 = −0.004, t = −1.536). This finding indicates that mar-
ket fragmentation does not stimulate quality competition in the large-client segment of the auditmarket.We interpret
this finding as a confirmation of our theory that in the large-client segment, where audits can be complex, market con-
centration is endogenous to clients’ demand for technology- and research-intensive audits. Consequently, highmarket
concentration does not prevent quality competition but rather helps audit firms to achieve economies of scale in the
audit technology and resource investments that are needed to offer high-quality audits of complex clients.
In summary, our tests of Hypotheses 1 and 2 provide evidence of rent extraction through concentration in the SME-
client segment of the audit market, where audit complexity is low. In this segment, market power facilitates audit firms
24Excluding Big N from the regression does not influence the direction or significance levels of the remaining explanatory variables. A potential explanation
for the negative association between Big Four and audit quality is that non-Big Four firms have a comparative advantage in auditing private clients, analogous
to the finding that small banks have a comparative advantage in lending to small borrowers (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan, & Stein, 2005). This may occur, for
example, if they specialize in using in their audits the soft information that private clients rely onmore strongly than public clients. Such resource partitioning
processes have been observed in the Belgian audit market (see Boone et al., 2009).
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TABLE 7 Regression analyses of the relationship between audit market structure and accrual quality
SME clients
(N = 10,845)
Large clients
(N = 4,930)
All clients
(N = 15,775)
(1) (2) (3)
Market Concentration 0.007** −0.004 0.001
(2.014) (−1.536) (0.587)
ClientMobility 0.002 −0.007*** −0.002**
(1.302) (−3.030) (−1.966)
ln(Age) −0.004* −0.005* −0.004**
(−1.696) (−1.756) (−2.467)
Growth 0.078*** 0.074*** 0.076***
(10.624) (6.314) (12.222)
Size −0.017*** −0.002 −0.011***
(−10.223) (−0.984) (−8.858)
Leverage 0.033*** 0.004 0.026***
(6.427) (0.535) (5.810)
Bankruptcy Risk 0.004 0.009* 0.007**
(1.150) (1.706) (2.205)
Operating Loss 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.022***
(5.913) (4.024) (7.663)
ROA 0.052*** 0.091*** 0.055***
(3.626) (3.103) (4.236)
Big Four 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.018***
(4.990) (3.141) (6.321)
Intangibles 0.096*** 0.037 0.076***
(3.350) (1.066) (3.410)
Diversification 0.003** 0.001 0.002*
(1.971) (0.346) (1.931)
Metropolis 0.002 −0.000 0.001
(0.701) (−0.016) (0.536)
Industry Expert 0.002 0.004 0.003
(0.483) (0.959) (1.149)
ln(Operating Cycle Length) −0.008*** −0.007*** −0.008***
(−5.027) (−3.242) (−6.322)
Large Client 0.003
(0.921)
Constant 0.226*** 0.112** 0.176***
(9.093) (2.513) (8.454)
R-Squared 9.24% 6.84% 7.98%
F-Value 23.61*** 262.65*** 10.30***
Notes: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed). t-Values are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered by client firm. Fixed effects for years and industries are included but not tabulated for reasons of brevity.
The dependent variable in the regressions is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated as the residual from the
modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., |DA|), an inversemeasure of accrual quality. Variables are defined in the appendix.
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in charging higher audit fees, while offering lower audit quality. In contrast, we find initial evidence that market frag-
mentation does not spur quality competition in the large-client segment, where audit complexity presumably necessi-
tates market concentration. In the following section we address the question of whether audit firms still compete on
price or quality in the large-client segment of the audit market.
5.2.2 Hypotheses 3 and 4: Client mobility
To test Hypothesis 3, i.e., that the association between client mobility and audit pricing is more pronounced for SME
clients than for large clients, we compare the coefficients on ClientMobility in columns 1 and 2 of Table 6.We find that
Client Mobility is negatively associated with audit fees, both in the sample of large clients (𝛽 = −0.033, t = −2.308)
and in the sample of SME clients (𝛽 = −0.017, t = −2.137). However, we do not find support for Hypothesis 3. Specif-
ically, untabulated tests indicate that the coefficients on Client Mobility in the two samples are not significantly dif-
ferent from each other.We interpret this finding as evidence that audit complexity does not prevent price competition
through its effect onmarket structure; audit firms engage in price competition to similar degrees in the large-client and
the SME segment of the audit market.
To test Hypothesis 4, i.e., that the effect of client mobility on audit quality is more pronounced in the SME-client
segment than in the large segment of the audit market, we turn to the coefficients on ClientMobility in columns 1 and
2ofTable7. The relationshipbetween theabsolute valueof discretionary accruals, our inversemeasureof audit quality,
and ClientMobility is negative and significant at the 1% level in the sample of large clients (𝛽 = −0.007, t = −3.030). In
contrast, this relationship is positive and not significantly different from zero in the sample of SME clients (𝛽 = 0.002,
t = 1.302).25 In otherwords, we find that increased clientmobility stimulates competition on quality in the large-client
segment of the audit market but not in the SME-client segment. This finding leads us to reject Hypothesis 4. In fact, we
conclude that, in conformity with the arguments of Buijink et al. (1998), audit markets can be competitive also when
audit complexity requires higher levels of concentration.
A noteworthy observation is that client mobility does not stimulate quality competition in the SME-client segment
of the audit market. A plausible explanation for this finding is that lowmobility of SME clients helps audit firms to pre-
serve the value of an audit partner’s tacit (difficult-to-transfer) client-specific knowledge (e.g., Johnson, Khurana, &
Reynolds, 2002), which in turn could help to improve audit quality. Because auditors of SMEs rely more than auditors
of large clients on personal knowledge and soft information acquired over time (see, e.g., Langli & Svanström, 2014;
Shukarova-Savovska & Hodge, 2016), preservation of tacit client-specific knowledge is likely more relevant to audit
quality in the SME-client segment than in the large-client segment. In summary, we thus find that client mobility stim-
ulates price competition throughout the audit market but stimulates quality competition only in the large-client seg-
ment of themarket, where audits aremore technology- and resource-intensive but presumably rely less on tacit client-
specific knowledge. Our tests of Hypothesis 3 and 4 again underline the importance of accounting for audit complexity
when examining the impact of market structure on audit pricing and quality.
5.3 Additional tests
5.3.1 Seemingly unrelated regressions
The analyses displayed in Tables 6 and7 estimate the effects ofmarket structure on audit fees and accrual quality sepa-
rately. It is possible that the audit pricing and audit quality decisions that auditors make are not independent but made
jointly. To account for the potential dependence of pricing and quality decisions we redo our analysis using Seemingly
Unrelated Regressions (SURs).
Columns 1 and 2 (3 and 4) of Table 8 display the SUR coefficient estimates for the sample of SME clients (large
clients). The Breusch-Pagan 𝜒2 statistics, displayed in columns 1 and 3, are statistically significant at the 1% level,
25Untabulated tests show that the coefficient on Client Mobility in the large-client sample is significantly different from that in the SME-client sample at the
1% level.
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TABLE 8 Seemingly unrelated regression analyses of audit fees and accrual quality for SME clients and large clients
SME clients Large clients
Ln(Audit Fees)
(N = 10,845)
| DA|
(N = 10,845)
Ln(Audit Fees)
(N = 4,930)
|DA|
(N = 4,930)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Concentration 0.122*** 0.007** 0.098*** −0.004
(6.862) (2.017) (5.960) (−1.578)
ClientMobility −0.017** 0.002 −0.033** −0.007***
(−2.097) (1.278) (−2.415) (−2.990)
ln(Age) 0.057*** −0.004** 0.111*** −0.005**
(6.317) (−1.995) (7.518) (−1.987)
Growth −0.165*** 0.078*** −0.108** 0.074***
(−6.159) (14.278) (−2.100) (9.078)
Size 0.268*** −0.017*** 0.340*** −0.002
(37.675) (−11.984) (31.569) (−1.091)
Leverage 0.142*** 0.033*** 0.075* 0.004
(6.678) (8.592) (1.664) (0.682)
Bankruptcy Risk 0.092*** 0.004 0.037 0.009*
(5.430) (1.248) (1.334) (1.949)
Operating Loss 0.069*** 0.020*** 0.069** 0.020***
(4.636) (6.635) (2.549) (4.749)
ROA 0.095* 0.052*** −0.076 0.091***
(1.922) (5.133) (−0.599) (4.532)
Big Four 0.459*** 0.017*** 0.602*** 0.015***
(30.192) (5.634) (22.337) (3.470)
Intangibles 0.639*** 0.096*** 0.854*** 0.037
(5.506) (4.116) (4.802) (1.326)
Diversification 0.029*** 0.003** 0.023* 0.001
(4.161) (2.103) (1.876) (0.362)
Metropolis 0.016 0.002 −0.137*** −0.000
(1.095) (0.808) (−5.452) (−0.017)
Industry Expert 0.123*** 0.002 0.202*** 0.004
(7.586) (0.544) (7.698) (1.050)
Quick Ratio −0.010*** −0.019***
(−5.342) (−6.495)
Receivables & Inventories 0.310*** 0.437***
(12.746) (9.947)
ln(Operating Cycle Length) −0.007*** −0.007***
(−6.163) (−3.813)
Constant −1.028*** 0.226*** −1.839*** 0.111***
(−9.318) (10.068) (−7.166) (2.750)
Pseudo R2 39.09% 9.24% 53.08% 6.84%
Chi2 6,974.71*** 1,102.67*** 5,586.98*** 361.27***
Breusch-Pagan Chi2 24.98*** 11.79***
Notes: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed). z-Values are in parentheses. Fixed effects
for years and industries are included but not tabulated for reasons of brevity. Variables are defined in the appendix.
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leading us to reject the null hypothesis that the error terms of the two equations are uncorrelated, both in the SME-
client and in the large-client segment. We thus find that audit pricing and audit quality decisions are not independent,
which confirms the relevance of using SUR regressions.
The coefficient on Market Concentration in column 1 remains positive and significantly different from zero (𝛽 =
0.122, z = 6.862). In addition, the effect ofMarket Concentration on audit quality, displayed in column 2, remains neg-
ative and significant (𝛽 = 0.007, z = 2.017). Hence, also when accounting for the potential dependence of quality and
pricing decisions, we find evidence that in the SME segment, market concentration deters price competition (support-
ing hypothesis 1) and reduces audit quality (supporting hypothesis 2).
The effect of Client Mobility on audit fees in the large-client segment, shown in column 3 of Table 8 (𝛽 = −0.033,
z = −2.415), remainsnegative, statistically different fromzerobutnot statistically distinguishable fromthe sameeffect
in the SME-client segment (𝛽 = −0.017, z = −2.097). Further, the effect of Client Mobility on audit quality remains
positive and significant in the large-client segment (𝛽 = −0.007, z = −2.990) and not significantly different from zero
in the SMEsegment (𝛽 = 0.002, z = 1.278).Overall, these findings confirm that audit complexity does not prevent price
competition (rejecting hypothesis 3) or quality competition (rejecting hypothesis 4).
In sum, the SUR analysis shows that our conclusions are robust to accounting for the dependence of audit quality
and audit pricing decisions.
5.3.2 Signed discretionary accruals
In ourmain analysis, wemeasure audit quality as the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This choice builds on the
premise that the audit aims at constraining both upward and downward earnings management. In an additional analy-
sis, we explicitly distinguish between both types of earningsmanagement, given that theymay have different economic
or regulatory implications. In many settings regulators and financial statement users typically focus on earnings man-
agement that overstates earnings (St. Pierre & Anderson, 1984; Becker et al., 1998). However, because the Belgian
audit market for private clients can be characterized as a market with moderate to high alignment of financial and tax
accounting (Van Tendeloo & Vanstraelen, 2008), income-decreasing accruals, aimed at tax avoidance, are likely to be
present and of economic relevance. To analyze whether market structure affects negative and positive discretionary
accruals differently, we re-estimate equation 6 in four subsamples, distinguishing SME and large clients with positive
discretionary accruals from SME and large clients with negative discretionary accruals. We note that in each regres-
sion, the absolute value of discretionary accruals is the dependent variable.
Columns 1 and2 (3 and4) of Table 9 display the coefficient estimate for the subsamples of SME clients (large clients)
with negative and positive discretionary accruals, respectively. Two findings are particularly noteworthy. First, we find
that the negative effect of Market Concentration on audit quality in the SME segment of the audit market applies to
negative discretionary accruals only (𝛽 = 0.011, t = 2.324). A plausible explanation for this finding is that tax avoidance
is particularly prevalent in the SME segment; an improvement in audit quality that results from a reduction in market
concentration helps to mitigate such tax avoidance. Second, we observe the positive effect of Client Mobility on audit
quality in the large-client segment only in the subsample of positive discretionary accruals (𝛽 = −0.010, t = 3.642).
This finding is intuitive and consistent with the idea that for large clients financial statements are important in reduc-
ing agency problems; large clients therefore have incentives to manage earnings upwards. Consequently, high-quality
audits in the large-client segment especially focus on constraining positive discretionary accruals. Overall, while pro-
viding an initial indication that financial statements serve different purposes for SME and large clients, the additional
analysis confirms that market structure affects audit quality in both segments of the audit market.
5.3.3 Audit complexity
An important premise of our analysis is that SME clients have less complex audits, on average, than large clients.
While we discussed various arguments for why client size can be considered a primary driver of audit complexity,
we acknowledge that audit complexity is a multi-faceted concept. To account for the multi-faceted nature of audit
complexity and test the robustness of our findings to using an alternativemeasure of audit complexity, we perform the
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TABLE 9 Regression analyses of the relationship between audit market structure and accrual quality for
companies, run separately for companies with income-increasing discretionary accruals and for companies with
income-decreasing discretionary accruals, while distinguishing SME clients from large clients
SME clients Large clients
DA< 0
(N = 5,234)
DA> 0
(N = 5,611)
DA< 0
(N = 2,378)
DA> 0
(N = 2,552)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Market Concentration 0.011** 0.004 −0.003 −0.006
(2.324) (0.722) (−0.754) (−1.636)
ClientMobility 0.002 0.002 −0.002 −0.010***
(0.746) (0.733) (−0.735) (−3.642)
ln(Age) −0.000 −0.007** −0.003 −0.007*
(−0.005) (−2.327) (−0.781) (−1.937)
Growth 0.079*** 0.071*** 0.068*** 0.074***
(7.906) (6.685) (3.870) (4.757)
Size −0.018*** −0.017*** −0.002 −0.002
(−7.922) (−7.030) (−0.649) (−0.842)
Leverage 0.061*** 0.009 0.035*** −0.020*
(8.950) (1.200) (3.333) (−1.783)
Bankruptcy Risk −0.017*** 0.024*** −0.009 0.024***
(−3.474) (4.555) (−1.369) (3.434)
Operating Loss 0.009** 0.029*** 0.011 0.027***
(2.006) (6.102) (1.495) (3.994)
ROA 0.065*** 0.029 0.090** 0.092**
(3.618) (1.292) (2.345) (2.075)
Big Four 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.012* 0.021***
(3.784) (3.866) (1.805) (3.485)
Intangibles 0.090*** 0.097* 0.042 0.012
(2.728) (1.945) (1.036) (0.213)
Diversification 0.003 0.003 0.002 −0.002
(1.186) (1.574) (0.642) (−0.627)
Metropolis −0.001 0.006 −0.003 0.003
(−0.229) (1.353) (−0.503) (0.483)
Industry Expert 0.000 0.002 0.006 0.001
(0.010) (0.391) (0.927) (0.081)
ln(Operating Cycle Length) −0.011*** −0.005*** −0.008** −0.007**
(−4.482) (−3.173) (−2.319) (−2.417)
Constant 0.255*** 0.206*** 0.069 0.146***
(7.328) (6.990) (1.285) (2.620)
R-Squared 11.60% 10.27% 7.74% 10.03%
F-Value 14.07*** 305.25*** 102.40*** 39.36***
Notes: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed). t-Values are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered by client firm. Fixed effects for years and industries are included but not tabulated for reasons of brevity.
The dependent variable in the regressions is the absolute value of discretionary accruals, calculated as the residual from the
modified Jones (1991) model (i.e., |DA|), an inversemeasure of accrual quality. Variables are defined in the appendix.
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following analysis. Based on the idea that the hiring of a Big Four audit firm reflects a client’s demand for technology-
and resource-intensive audits with noise, we measure audit complexity as the estimated probability of hiring a Big
Four audit firm, conditional on observable measures of client complexity. In particular, we use the following estimated
logistic regression equation to predict the probability of hiring a Big Four firm and split the sample on the median
probability (denoting high probabilities as high audit complexity):
P(Big Four = 1)it = (−0.17) ln(Age) + (−0.19)Growth + (0.11) Size + (0.36) Large Client (7)
+ (0.43) Intangibles + (−0.09) ln(Operating Cycle Length)
+ (0.09)Diversification + (−0.40)Receivable&Inventories +
∑
𝛿
Industry
where all variables are as defined in the appendix and all coefficient estimates are statistically significant at the 1%
level, with the exception of the coefficients on Growth (p < 0.05) and Intangibles (p = 0.20).
Panel A of Table 10 displays the coefficients on Market Concentration and Client Mobility in regression equation
6 that we obtain when using the alternative measure of audit complexity to partition the sample. Control variables as
shown inTables 6 and7 are included in the regressions but not tabulated. All displayed coefficient estimates are consis-
tent in sign and significance with those displayed in Tables 6 and 7, providing further support to our main conclusions.
5.3.4 Other additional tests
To test the robustness of our results, we perform the following additional analyses:
• Theprevious analyseswerebasedona sample that includes subsidiaries, allowingus toexamine theauditmarket as a
whole. Subsidiariesmay have less discretion in their auditor choice than non-subsidiaries.We therefore re-estimate
equation 6 after removing subsidiaries from our sample. The reduced sample contains 12,920 observations. The
coefficients on Market Concentration and Client Mobility in these additional regressions, displayed in Panel B of
Table 10, are consistent in sign and significance with those shown in Tables 6 and 7.
• In the previous audit fee analyses, we used the natural logarithm of audit fees as the dependent variable. Following
Simunic (1984), we re-estimate regression equation 6 using audit fees scaled by the square root of total assets as
the dependent variable. Panel C of Table 10 displays the coefficients on Market Concentration and Client Mobility
of this regression analysis. Althoughwe find that the coefficient onClientMobility is no longer significantly different
from zero, the results remain to support hypothesis 1 and reject hypothesis 3, thus leaving our main conclusions
unchanged.
• To test the robustness of our results to changes in the measurement of discretionary accruals, we perform the fol-
lowing additional analyses. First, we re-estimate regression equation 6 using discretionary accruals thatwe estimate
by industry-year rather than by year and size group.26 Second, following Collins, Pungaliya, and Vijh (2017), we re-
estimate discretionary accruals after including indicator variables for quintiles of (a) the current percentage sales
growth and (b) current ROA in the accruals estimation regression (equation 5), to account for nonlinearities in the
relationship between accruals and growth or performance. Third, motivated by the findings of Owens et al. (2017),
who show that idiosyncratic shocks experienced by a firm or by the peer firms included in the accruals estimation
regression (hereafter: peers) add noise to discretionary accruals estimates, we re-run the audit quality regressions
after controlling for the following measures of such shocks: (a) the absolute value of asset-scaled extraordinary
items, (b) the average absolute value of peers’ asset-scaled extraordinary items, (c) the fraction of peers experi-
encing an operating loss, and (d) the standard deviation of peers’ ROA. Panels D through F of Table 10 display the
coefficients on Market Concentration and Client Mobility in these three additional tests. The coefficient
26In this analysis, we define industries using two-digit NACE codes.We remove industry-years having fewer than 20 observations.
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TABLE 10 Summary of additional analyses
DV=Audit Fees DV= | DA|
SMEs/Low
complexity
LEs/High
complexity
SMEs/Low
complexity
LEs/High
complexity
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Partitioning on an alternative complexity measure (N = 7,887 in both partitions)
Market Concentration 0.167*** 0.070*** 0.007** −0.002
(8.514) (3.705) (2.357) (−0.765)
ClientMobility −0.024*** −0.022** 0.002 −0.004**
(−2.834) (−2.061) (0.937) (−2.411)
Panel B: Excluding subsidiaries from the sample (N = 9,322 SMEs; 3,598 LEs)
Market Concentration 0.122*** 0.083*** 0.007* −0.001
(5.529) (3.391) (1.819) (−0.391)
ClientMobility −0.020** −0.047*** 0.001 −0.006***
(−2.299) (−2.908) (0.758) (−2.817)
Panel C: Scaling audit fees by square root of total assets (N = 10,845 SMEs; 4,930 LEs)
Market Concentration 0.016*** 0.010***
(5.390) (4.432)
ClientMobility −0.000 −0.003*
(−0.053) (−1.690)
Panel D: DA estimated by industry-year (N = 9,607 SMEs; 4,333 LEs)
Market Concentration 0.006* −0.006**
(1.650) (−2.362)
ClientMobility 0.003* −0.006***
(1.806) (−2.585)
Panel E: DA estimated after controlling for nonlinearities (N = 10,845 SMEs; 4,930 LEs)
Market Concentration 0.007* −0.004
(1.944) (−1.620)
ClientMobility 0.002 −0.007***
(0.921) (−3.154)
Panel F: Controlling for idiosyncratic shocks (N = 10,845 SMEs; 4,930 LEs)
Market Concentration 0.007** −0.004*
(2.061) (−1.650)
ClientMobility 0.002 −0.006***
(1.188) (−2.905)
Notes: ***, **, * indicate 1%, 5%, and 10% significance levels, respectively (two-tailed). t-Values are in parentheses. Standard
errors are clustered by client firm. This table shows various replications of the analyses shown in Tables 6 and 7. Columns 1
and 3 display results for SME clients (labeled SMEs) or low audit complexity; columns 2 and 4 display results for large clients
(labeled LEs) or high audit complexity. Control variables, as shown in Tables 6 and 7, and fixed effects for years and industries
are included but not tabulated for reasons of brevity. Market Concentration and ClientMobility are defined in the appendix.
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estimates in all three panels support hypothesis 2 and reject hypothesis 4, thus leaving our main conclusions
unchanged.
6 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
Motivated by regulators’ concern about a potential lack of competition in audit markets (e.g., CMA (2019); European
Commission, 2010; FRC, 2018; GAO, 2003, 2008; House of Lords, 2011), we examine the relationship between local
market structure, audit pricing, and audit quality. We analyze a comprehensive set of Belgian private-client audits,
while defining local audit markets along two dimensions, geography and client size, and using both a static and a
dynamic market structure measure, i.e., market concentration and client mobility. To isolate the effect of audit com-
plexity onmarket concentration, we divide the auditmarket into two segments: the SME-client segment and the large-
client segment. We show that market concentration impairs price and quality competition in the SME-client segment,
where audits have low complexity. However, in the large-client segment, where clients’ demand for technology- and
resource-intensive audits creates a need for scale economies and, in turn, formarket concentration, concentration and
audit quality are unrelated. In this segment, client mobility is negatively associated with audit fees and positively asso-
ciated with audit quality, illustrating that also more concentrated audit markets can be price- and quality-competitive
if clients are sufficiently mobile.
Our findings have important implications for the auditing profession and regulators. First, our findings provide sup-
port for the view that market concentration is harmful to competition if it serves no clear economic purpose, as in the
SME-client segment of the audit market. However, our findings contradict the view that market concentration impairs
audit quality in the large-client segment. Instead, market concentration can have a net beneficial effect on quality in
the large-client segment, as it helps audit firms to achieve scale economies in audit technology and resources. Our evi-
dence indicates that in this segment competition can be improved by facilitating clientmobility rather than by reducing
market concentration. While we consider it possible that the introduction of joint audits, as for example suggested by
theUKCompetition&MarketsAuthority (2019) and theEuropeanCommission (2010), helps to stimulate clientmobil-
ity without eroding large audit firms’ economies of scale, we leave this issue to future research. Second, we show that
regulation targeted at one client-size segment of the audit market could have negative spillover effects on the other
segment as the effects of market concentration and client mobility on audit quality differ between the two segments.
Hence, our findings suggest that it is important for regulators to recognize that the impact of audit regulation on audit
quality is contingent on client complexity.
This study is not without limitations. First, our focus on private clients brings many benefits but forces us to
rely on one proxy for audit quality, the magnitude of discretionary accruals. Although this is a commonly used mea-
sure of audit quality (Becker et al., 1998), it is not without limitations. Hence, it is worthwhile for future studies
to examine the effect of market structure on audit quality in settings for which alternative measures of audit qual-
ity are available. Second, while we have taken utmost care in specifying the regression models, we note that some
control variables that have been used in public-client studies (particularly non-audit fees, office size, and auditor
tenure) are not available to us. This remains a limitation as we cannot assess their possible impact on our main
conclusions.
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APPENDIX: VARIABLE DEFINITIONS
Age = Client firm’s age in years.
Audit Fees = Client’s audit fees in thousands of euros.
Bankruptcy Risk = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client has a high risk of going
bankrupt, based on the bankruptcy predictionmodel byOoghe
and Verbaere (1982).
Big Four = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is audited by one of the
largest four audit firms.
ClientMobility = Market share instability, measured as the sum of the absolute
values of the annual percentage-point changes in market shares
of all audit firms in a client’s local audit market.We use
standardized values of this measure in our regression analyses.
DA = Themagnitude of discretionary accruals, calculated as the residual
from themodified Jones (1991) model.
Diversification = Variable indicating the number of industries in which a client
operates.
Growth = Client’s growth in total assets from year t − 1 to year t, scaled by
beginning of the year total assets.
Herfindahl Index = Herfindahl market share concentration index of the client’s local
audit market, defined as the collection of all similar-sized clients
within a 50 km radius of its auditor.
Industry Expert = Indicator variable equal to 1when an audit firm is the top-ranked
or second-ranked audit firmwithin a 2-digit NACE industry.
Intangibles = Client’s intangible assets scaled by total assets.
Large Client = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is a large enterprise. Using
a simplified version of the size thresholds laid out in the Fourth
EUAccounting Directive, sample firms denoted as large
enterprises have (1) a balance sheet total greater than
€ 17.5million and (2) revenues in excess of € 35million.
Leverage = Client’s total debt divided by total assets.
Market Concentration = Composite score based on the average of Herfindahl Index and
Average Portfolio Size, after standardizing the variables to zero
mean and unit standard deviation.
Metropolis = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client is located in Brussels or
Antwerp.
Operating Cycle Length = Client’s length of the operating cycle, measured as the sum of
average days receivables and average day payables.
Operating Loss = Indicator variable equal to 1 if the client’s operating profit was
negative in the prior fiscal year.
Portfolio Size = Sum of the natural logarithms of total assets of all clients in a
client’s local audit market, divided by the number of individual
audit partners operating in that market.
Quick Ratio = Client’s quick ratio, computed as current assets minus inventory,
divided by current liabilities.
Receivables & Inventories = Client’s receivables plus inventory scaled by total assets.
ROA = Client’s return on assets, computed as net income divided by
average total assets.
Size = The natural logarithm of the client’s end-of-year total assets in
thousands of euros.
